Oakland Firestorm of 1991
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Categories: Berkeley, California | History of Oakland, California | Urban fires in the United States | 1991 in the United States | 1991 disasters | Wildfires in California
 The Oakland Firestorm of 1991 was a large urban fire that occurred on the hillsides of northern Oakland, California and southeastern Berkeley on Sunday October 20, 1991, almost exactly two years after the Loma Prieta earthquake. The fire has also been called the Oakland hills firestorm, the East Bay Hills Fire, and the Tunnel Fire (because of its origin above the west portal of the Caldecott Tunnel) in Oakland. The fire ultimately killed 25 people and injured 150 others. The 1,520 acres (6.2 km²) destroyed included 2,843 single-family dwellings and 437 apartment and condominium units. The economic loss has been estimated at $1.5 billion.[1]
Origins of the fireThe fire started on Saturday, October 19, from an incompletely extinguished grass fire in the Berkeley Hills northeast of the intersection of California State Routes 24 and 13 (0.5 mi (0.8 km) north of the Caldecott Tunnel east portal). Firefighters fought the five-acre fire on a steep hillside above 7151 Buckingham Blvd., and by Saturday night they thought everything was under control. The fire re-ignited shortly before 11:00 am on Sunday, October 20. It re-started as a brush fire and rapidly spread southwest driven by wind gusts up to 65 mi (100 km) per hour.[2] It quickly overwhelmed local and eventually regional firefighting resources. By 11:30 a.m., the fire had spread to the nearby Parkwoods Apartments located next to the Caldecott Tunnel. Shortly before noon the fire had been blown up to the top of Hiller Highlands to the west from where it began its sweep down into the Hiller Highlands development and the southern hills of Berkeley. The fire tossed embers from the burning houses and vegetation into the air as it went. These embers were swept away by the torrid winds only to float back to earth to start the blaze in new locations. Half an hour later, these embers enabled the fire to jump across both Highway 24, an eight-lane freeway, and Highway 13, a four-lane freeway, eventually igniting hundreds of houses in the Forest Park neighborhood on the northwest edge of the Montclair district and in the upper Rockridge Neighborhood. The fire eventually touched the edge of Piedmont burning some municipal property, but no buildings or houses. The hot, dry northeasterly winds, dubbed by the media at this time as "Diablo winds," periodically occur during the early fall season. The fire began generating its own wind, the defining characteristic of a firestorm. The self-generated winds interacted with the ambient wind to create erratic, dangerous gusts, which in turn helped produce numerous cyclonic swirls. All of these combined to help spread the fire, tossing embers in all directions. By mid-afternoon, the wind had slowed and shifted to the west, driving the fire to the southeast. At about 9 pm, the wind abruptly stopped, giving firefighters a chance to gain containment of the fire.[3] Firefighting response and difficulties
 Assistance from Bay Area firefighting agencies as far as Fremont was quickly mobilized and sent to the fire zone. The California Department of Forestry (CDF) dispatched several tankers, which doused the fire with tons of fire retardant all day long. The CDF established a base at the Naval Air Station in Alameda. Additionally, the Naval Air Station itself sent its own firefighting equipment and material to the scene of the fire. The next morning, before full control had been gained, satellite photographs, especially infrared (heat-sensing) photographs, were provided with the help of NASA Ames Research Center's Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team (DART) to aid firefighters in plotting the extent of the fire and spotting hidden hot spots. For a variety of reasons, the firefighting teams were initially overwhelmed by the firestorm. Flames took out power lines to seventeen pumping stations in the Oakland water system. Outside fire teams faced various equipment compatibility issues such as hydrants having the wrong size couplings for the hoses used by neighboring counties. Oakland was also not able to communicate with many mutual aid resources due to antiquated equipment and lack of access to statewide radio frequencies. Firefighters in some areas simply ran out of water.[4] However, the most important factor was the rapid spread of the fire. Before most of the firefighting resources could be brought to the scene, the fire had established a large perimeter. At the fires peak it would destroy 1 home every 11 seconds. By the first hour the fire had destroyed nearly 790 structures. In addition to the winds and the heat, an important factor in the rapid spread of the fire was that it started in an area that was at an interface between developed and undeveloped land. Many of the first dwellings to burn were surrounded by thick, dry vegetation. In addition, the nearby undeveloped land had even more dry brush along with several groves of non-native volatile eucalyptus trees. The same conditions contributed to a major conflagration in nearby Berkeley in 1923 (named the 1923 Berkeley Fire) and a more limited conflagration in the same area in 1970. As night descended, the firestorm threatened to destroy the historic Claremont Resort hotel where the media had gathered to report on the fire. Television crews trained their cameras on the dark hill immediately behind the hotel and millions watched as houses abandoned to the fire lit up in flames as the fire slowly marched house by house towards the evacuated hotel. The fire was stopped shortly before it reached the hotel. By 5:00pm the winds died down give firefighters a chance to get a handle on the blaze full containment would not be achieved until October 22. By Wednesday October 23, at 8:00 am the fire was declared under control almost 72 hours after it started. as many as 400 engine compaines,1500 personal, and 250 agencies worked to put out the fire that would be called the worst natural disaster at that time. AftermathNewly rebuilt homes have dramatically changed the architectural character of the affected region. Several nonprofit groups arose after the fire. One, the Hills Emergency Forum, was created by local fire agencies to build consensus on fire safety standards and codes, offer multi-jurisdictional training, and coordinate fuel reduction strategies, as well as other goals. At least two citizen groups also arose, the North Hills Phoenix Association and the Claremont Canyon Conservancy to participate in policy decisions and provide educational and stewardship services at the urban-wild land interface. In response to issues about firefighting equipment during the disaster, Oakland firefighters now carry wildland firefighting gear or "Nomex". This gear is what all wildland firefighters wear during operations. Prior to and during this firestorm, Oakland city firefighters were not provided with this gear and were forced to don turn-outs or structure gear. This type of gear greatly hampered their ability to move quickly and stay cooler during a wildland fire. Hose couplings are now standard everywhere because the lack of a standard in 1991 led to water running out nearly everywhere. Water cisterns and a new hills fire station were added, and radio communications were improved. However, Berkeley firefighters still use different radio frequencies than Oakland, though they carry extra radios that allow them to communicate using the 800 megahertz system.[5][6][7][8][9] In popular culture
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