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- For the similarly named battle during the Seven-Year War, see Battle of Imjin River (1592).
The Battle of the Imjin River took place 22 April – 25 April 1951 during the Korean War. The opposing forces were the attacking People's Volunteer Army of the People's Republic of China aiding North Korea and the defending British Force sent to aid South Korea and under the command of the United Nations.
In April 1951, the Chinese Spring Offensive, also known as the Fifth Phase Offensive, was launched. This was a major effort, involving 3 Field Armies (up to 700,000 men). The main blow fell on U.S. I Corps, but fierce resistance in battles at Kapyong and the Imjin river blunted its impetus, and the Chinese were halted at a defensive line north of Seoul (referred to as No-Name Line).
Background
The battle took place during the Chinese Spring Offensive for which the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese and North Korean Communist Forces in the Field, General Peng Dehuai, issued an operational directive that summarizes the initial objective as follows:
- First of all, we will mass our forces to wipe out the 6th Division of the Puppet Army, the British 27th Brigade, the American 3rd Division (less one regiment), the Turkish Brigade, the British 29th Brigade and the 1st Division of the Puppet Army [...].[1]
Among the forces involved on the Chinese side was the 3rd Field Army, consisting of the 64th Army on the western flank, 63rd Army in the centre, and 65th Army in the east. These were positioned on the northern bank of the Imjin River but concentrated some way back, as was usual for Chinese forces at the time. Three divisions of 63rd Army, the 187th, 188th and 189th Division, were involved in the attack on the British 29th Infantry Brigade’s positions on the Imjin river from 22 April - 25 April 1951 in what became known as the Battle of the Imjin River.[2] 25 miles further to the east, other elements of the Chinese forces were involved in an attack on UN forces which included 27th British Commonwealth Brigade. That battle became known as the Battle of Kapyong.[3]
At the time of the Chinese attack, the British 29th Infantry Brigade (commanded by Brigadier Tom Brodie) consisted of the 1st Battalion, the Gloucestershire Regiment (also called "The Glosters"), under Lieutenant-Colonel James P. Carne, the 1st Battalion, the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers (RNF) under Lieutenant-Colonel Kingsley Foster, the 1st Battalion, the Royal Ulster Rifles (RUR) under the temporary command of Major Gerald Rickord and the Belgian battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Crahay to which Luxembourg's contribution to the UN forces was attached.[4] 29th Brigade was one of two UN formations responsible for holding the western flank on the lower Imjin river, the other being 1st Republic of Korea (ROK) Division, which was positioned further to the west. Further to the east of 29th Brigade’s position stood the US 3rd Infantry Division (see map).[5]
The deployment of UN forces meant that 29th Brigade with its four battalions had to cover a front of twelve miles according to one source, seven and a half miles according to another.[6] Regardless of the exact front length, the consequence was that gaps between units had to be accepted because there was no possibility of forming a continuous line with the forces available. As a result, “Brigadier Brodie determinded to deploy his men in separate unit positions, centred upon key hill features”.[7] On the left flank, the Glosters were guarding a ford over the Imjin, known as Gloster crossing; the RNF were deployed in the centre and on the right flank, while the Belgians were the only element of 29th Brigade north of the river, occupying a feature called Hill 196, around the village of Tagampo. The Royal Ulster Rifles served as the brigade’s reserve.[8]
The scattered deployment was one aspect which complicated the defense of the position. Another aspect was the lack of heavy artillery. Fire support was provided by 45 Field Regiment, RA, equipped with 25 pounders and also by C Troop, 170 Heavy Mortar Battery, RA. No heavier artillery support was available.[9] In addition, defensive preparations were not carried out very extensively because the British expected to hold the position for only a short time. As a result, neither minefields, deeply dug shelters nor extensive wire obstacles existed. The British position on the Imjin river "was deemed safe" but vulnerable in case of an attack.[10]
Battle
The first Night of Attacks
The battle opened on the night of 22 April 1951; after a fierce bombardment, three Chinese divisions of the 63rd Army attacked along 29th Brigade's front. On the right, elements of 29th Brigade’s reserve, the 1st RUR, were deployed forward at about 10 p.m. in order to secure a ford over the Imjin which was known as Ulster crossing. Like all other battalions of 29th Brigade, the Ulsters were soon engaged by Chinese forces trying to cross the river and could not secure the ford although they managed to keep open the brigade’s main line of communication on the right.[11] However, the developments at Ulster crossing meant that the Belgian battalion on the north bank of the river was in danger of being isolated from the other elements of 29th Brigade.
To the left of the brigade’s line, the Glosters’ right and left forward companies, A and D company, engaged Chinese units trying to cross the Imjin. A forward deployed patrol under the command of Lieutenant Guy Ward managed to repel four Chinese attempts to cross the river but was eventually forced to fall back. By morning of the next day, A company had suffered severe casualties; only one officer remained in action. Casualties included the company commander, Major Pat Angier, who was killed during the night. Despite its losses, A company received the order to hold its position because a retreat at this stage would have threatened the positions of the entire battalion.[12]
In the centre and on the right of the brigade’s line, the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers tried to hold their positions but X company, the battalion’s left forward company had to withdraw. Chinese forces also managed to gain control of positions behind Y company, the right forward battalion. After unsuccessful British attempts to regain them, Y company’s position was abandoned, the retreat being covered by Centurion tanks of C Squadron, 8th Hussars, under the command of Major Henry Huth.[13]
The Glosters' Withdrawal to Hill 235
On 23 April, attempts by the Fusiliers and an American battalion to regain control of areas lost during the night failed. However, those attempts distracted Chinese forces and allowed the Belgian battalion to escape from its perilous position on the north bank of the river. With American tank support, the Belgians escaped to the east and took up new positions south of the Glosters and the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers.[14]
At around 8.30 p.m. on 23 April, the forward companies of the Glosters were withdrawn from their positions after suffering heavy casualties. Apart from A and D company, C company under Major Paul Mitchell retreated as well but because of enemy pressure it was impossible for B company under Major Denis Harding to join the battalion’s remaining elements on Hill 235, a position between the Imjin and the Seolmacheon stream that became known as Gloster Hill. The men of B company had to endure seven Chinese assaults on their position before they were also able to withdraw to Hill 235 the next morning. Only 17 men of B company remained in action after reaching the remainder of the battalion.[15]
During the night in which the Glosters’ B company faced numerous attacks, the Chinese 188th Division crossed the Imjin and attacked the Fusiliers and the Royal Ulster Rifles on the right of the brigade’s line. The 187th Division also engaged the brigade’s battalions on the right, while the 189th Division kept up the pressure on the left.[16] The Glosters were surrounded by Chinese forces on 24 April. An attempt by Centurions of the 8th Hussars supported by a Philippine infantry battalion of the US 3rd Infantry Division to make contact with the Glosters on Hill 235 failed when the leading tank of the relief column was hit, blocking the route and making any further advance impossible.[17]
The Retreat of 29th Brigade
In the night of 24/25 April, 29th Brigade received the order to disengage and to retreat to a new line of defense north of Seoul. The brigade began its retreat at 8 a.m. the next morning. Supported by C Squadron, 8th Hussars, and 55 Squadron, Royal Engineers, the 1st Battalion, the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, the 1st Battalion, the Royal Ulster Rifles, and the Belgian battalion tried to reach the safety of the next UN position. Their withdrawal while being under intense enemy pressure was made even more difficult by the fact that Chinese forces dominated parts of the high ground along the line of retreat and were thus able not only to observe their movements but also to inflict heavy casualties on the retreating units. Among those killed was the CO of the Fusiliers, Lieutenant-Colonel Foster, who died when his jeep was hit by Chinese mortar fire. In the words of Major Henry Huth of the 8th Hussars, the retreat was "one long bloody ambush".[18] At one stage of the retreat, two Centurions had to machine-gun each other in order to repel Chinese infantry which tried to climb onto their hulls. When B company of the Ulsters which had acted as rear guard during the retreat reached the safety of the UN line, all elements of 29th Brigade except for the Glosters had completed the withdrawal.[19]
The Glosters on Hill 235
The Glosters' situation on Hill 235 made it impossible for them to join the rest of 29th Brigade after it had received the order to retreat. Even before the failed attempt to relieve the battalion on 24 April, B and C company had already suffered such heavy casualties that they were merged to form one company. Attempts to supply the battalion by air drop or to evacuate the wounded by helicopter were unsuccessful. Despite their difficult situation, the Glosters held the positions on "their" hill throughout 24 April and the night of 24/25 April. In the morning of 25 April, 45 Field Regiment could no longer provide artillery support for the Glosters. Brigadier Brodie had left the decision whether to attempt a break out or to surrender to Lieutenant-Colonel Carne. The Glosters' CO "gave the order to his company commanders to make for the British lines as best as they could" on the morning of 25 April.[20] Only the remains of D company under the command of Major Mike Harvey escaped successfully from "Gloster Hill" and reached the safety of friendly lines after several days. The rest of the battalion were taken prisoner, including Lieutenant-Colonel Carne.[21]
Aftermath
Importance of the battle
Had the Chinese achieved a breakthrough in the initial stages of their assault, they would have been able to outflank the 1st ROK Division to the west and the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division to the east of 29th Brigade. Such a development would have threatened the stability of the UN line and increased the likelihood of success for a Chinese advance on Seoul. Although the Chinese benefitted from 29th Brigade's scattered deployment and a lack of defensive preparations, they were nevertheless unable to overcome the positions before UN forces could check further advances. In the 3 days of fighting, the determined resistance of the 29th Brigade severely disrupted the Chinese offensive, causing it to lose momentum and allowed UN forces in the area to withdraw to the No-Name Line, a defensible position north of Seoul, where the Chinese were halted.[22][23][24]
Casualties and Memorial
According to Anthony Farrar-Hockley, 29th Brigade suffered 1,091 casualties or 20 per cent compared to its strength on the eve of battle.[25] "169 of 850 Gloucesters mustered for rollcall with the brigade after the battle", according to Hastings.[26] 63 soldiers of the Gloucestershire Regiment were killed in action and about three times as many were wounded. 30 men died while in captivity.[27]
Based on estimates, Chinese casualties in the Battle of the Imjin River can be put at around 10,000.[28]
Today, a memorial stands at the foot of Gloster Hill 37°56′39″N 126°56′10″E / 37.944198, 126.936035, beside the Seolmacheon stream and the British Embassy in Seoul organises services for veterans on every anniversary of the battle.
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Veterans on Gloster Bridge.JPG
Veterans on Gloster Bridge
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Australian military attache on Gloster Bridge.JPG
Australian military attaché on Gloster Bridge
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British military attache and other officers on Gloster Bridge.JPG
British military attaché and other officers on Gloster Bridge
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Korean veterans with a New Zealand veteran by Seolmacheon.JPG
Korean veterans with a New Zealand veteran by Seolmacheon
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Gloster Memorial by Seolmacheon.jpg
Gloster Memorial by Seolmacheon
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South Korean troops at Gloster Memorial by Seolmacheon.JPG
South Korean troops at Gloster Memorial by Seolmacheon
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British veterans march by Seolmacheon.JPG
British veterans march by Seolmacheon
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Colours paraded by Seolmacheon.JPG
Colours paraded by Seolmacheon
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Colours at the Gloster monument by Seolmacheon.JPG
Colours at the Gloster monument by Seolmacheon
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Veterans by Gloster monument by Seolmacheon.JPG
Veterans by Gloster monument by Seolmacheon
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Flags flying by Gloster Memorial by Seolmacheon.JPG
Flags flying by Gloster Memorial by Seolmacheon
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Awards and Citations
The Gloucestershire Regiment has a long history of distinguished service since the Battle of Alexandria in 1801. Since then it has the distinction of wearing badges both at the front and at the back of their head-dress. In the Battle of the Imjin River two Victoria Crosses and one George Cross were awarded to soldiers of the Gloucestershire Regiment:
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