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Bay of Pigs Invasion

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Bay of Pigs Invasion
Part of Cold War
Image:Alerta.jpg
Cuban poster warning before invasion showing a soldier armed with an RPD Light machine gun.
Date April 15 – 19, 1961
Location Bay of Pigs, southern Cuba
Result Decisive Communist victory
Belligerents
Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces Cuban exiles trained by the United States
Commanders
Fidel Castro
José Ramón Fernández
Ernesto "Che" Guevara
Image:Flag of the Soviet Union 1955.svg Francisco Ciutat de Miguel		 John F. Kennedy
Grayston Lynch
Pepe San Roman
Erneido Oliva
Strength
15,000 1,511 Cuban exiles
2 CIA agents
Casualties and losses
176 killed[1] (Regular Army) 4,000- 5,000 killed, missing, or wounded (Militias)[2][3] 115 killed
1,189 captured

The 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion was an unsuccessful attempted invasion by armed Cuban exiles in southwest Cuba, planned and funded by the United States, in an attempt to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro. This action accelerated a rapid deterioration in Cuban-American relations, which was further worsened by the Cuban Missile Crisis the following year.

The invasion is named after the Bay of Pigs, where the landing took place. It is known in Cuba as Invasión de Bahía de Cochinos or Playa Girón.

Contents

Background

On March 17, 1960, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration agreed to a recommendation from the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, to equip and drill Cuban exiles for action against the new government of Fidel Castro.[4] Eisenhower stated it was the policy of the U.S. government to aid anti-Castro guerrilla forces.[citation needed] The CIA began to recruit and train anti-Castro forces in the Sierra Madre on the Pacific coast of Guatemala.[4]

The CIA was initially confident it was capable of overthrowing Castro, having experience assisting in the overthrow of other foreign governments such as the government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 and Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in 1954. Richard Mervin Bissell, Jr., one of Allen Dulles' three aides, was made director of Operation Zapata, the CIA's codename for the operation.

The original plan called for landing the exile Brigade 2506 in the vicinity of the old colonial city of Trinidad, Cuba, in the central province of Sancti Spiritus approximately 250 miles (400 km) southeast of Havana, at the foothills of the Escambray Mountains.

The Trinidad site provided several options that the exile brigade could exploit during the invasion. The population of Trinidad was generally opposed to Castro, and the rugged mountains outside the city provided an area into which the invasion force could retreat and establish a guerrilla campaign if the landing faltered. Throughout 1960, the growing ranks of Brigade 2506 trained throughout southern Florida and in Guatemala for the beach landing and possible mountain retreat.

On February 17, 1961, U.S. President John F. Kennedy asked his advisors whether the toppling of Castro might be related to weapon shipments and if it was possible to claim the real targets were modern fighter aircraft and rockets that endangered America's security. At the time, Cuba's army possessed Soviet tanks, artillery and small arms, and its air force consisted of A-26 Invader medium bombers, Hawker Sea Furies and T-33 jets left over from the Batista Air Force.[5]

As Kennedy's plans evolved, critical details were changed that were to hamper chances of a successful mission without overt U.S. military support. These revised details included changing the landing area for Brigade 2506 to two points in Matanzas Province, 202 km southeast of Havana on the eastern edge of the Zapata peninsula at the Bay of Pigs. The landings would take place on the Girón and Zapatos Larga beaches. This change effectively cut off contact with the rebels of the "War Against the Bandits" uprising in the Escambray Mountains. The Castro government also had been warned by senior KGB agents Osvaldo Sánchez Cabrera and "Aragon", who died violently before and after the invasion, respectively.[6]The U.S. government was aware that a high casualty rate was possible.[citation needed].

Through their secret intelligence, as well as loose talk in Miami, the Cuban security apparatus knew the invasion was coming. More than 100,000 Cubans suspected to be security threats or "politically unreliable" were rounded up and arrested throughout the island by the political police in anticipation of the invasion. The arrests were facilitated by informants and the diligent work of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) working in conjunction with the secret police, the G-2s. Nevertheless, days before the invasion, multiple acts of sabotage were carried out, such as the bombing of the El Encanto department store in Havana, desultory explosions, and arson.

Potential enemies of the Revolution were neutralized, arrested, or shot while resisting arrest. Because of the lack of prison space (apparently Batista had not built enough jails), suspected counter-revolutionaries were unceremoniously rounded up and corralled in any facility available, be it sports stadium, school or schoolyard, etc., to prevent the people from aiding the expected invading force.
Dr. Miguel A. Faria Jr.[7]

Hispano-Soviet advisors to Cuban government forces

Soviet-trained advisors were brought to Cuba from East Bloc countries. These advisors had held high staff positions in the Soviet Armies during WWII and having resided in the Soviet Union for long periods are thus known as "Hispano-Soviets"; the most senior of these were the Spanish Communists veterans of the Spanish Civil War Francisco Ciutat de Miguel, Enrique Lister and Cuba born (1892) Alberto Bayo.[8] Ciutat de Miguel (Masonic name: Algazel; Russian name: Pavel Pavlovich Stepanov; Cuban alias: Ángel Martínez Riosola, commonly referred to as Angelito) is said to have arrived the same day as the La Coubre explosion; he was wounded in the foot during the War Against the Bandits. Date of wound is not given in references cited.[9]

The role of other Soviet Agents at the time is not well known, although they were there and well established in Cuba at the time of the Bay of Pigs Invasion and can be presumed that in that emergency to have been actively involved in the Cuban government's defence. Some of these agents acquired far greater notoriety later. For instance, two KGB colonels, Vadim Kochergin and Victor Simanov were first sighted in Cuba about September 1959.[10][11]

Some personages involved

Cuban government order of battle

The Cuban government order of battle is unclear and subject to dispute. Fidel Castro is given credit for directing strategy by Cuban government sources. At least nominally, Juan Almeida[12] was replaced by Sergio del Valle Jimenez[13], head of the Cuban Armed Forces in 1961. Antonio Enrique Lusson Batlle, a Raul Castro loyalist is also placed there[14]

Orlando Rodriguez Puerta, previous commander of Castro's personal guard, was charged with direction of Cuban government forces in Matanzas Province directly north of combat area. El Gallego Fernández José Ramón Fernández is often said to have held a senior command. Hispano-Soviets Francisco Ciutat de Miguel, Enrique Lister, and Alberto Bayo were advisors/and or commanders to intelligence and militia forces. Ciutat de Miguel under the name Angel Martínez Riosola was a significant leader/advisor for Cuban forces coming from Central Provinces. Victor Emilo Dreke Cruz, although nominally in charge of Central Province forces is generally considered to have played subordinate role to Ciutate de Miguel. Victor Emilo Dreke Cruz describes his part in the action as first fighting with parachutists and then being wounded in an ambush[15] The documentary "Brothers in Arms"[16][17] covers the life of one South African, a Robert Herboldt who had a role as quartermaster. Jacques Lagas a fighter pilot from Chile had a major role in the air defense (see air action). Lagas disputes credit with Rafael del Pino for air actions. While his presence at the site of action is generally conceded, the exact role of Arnaldo Ochoa, later to be commander of Cuban forces in Angola, is obscure.

Suppression of internal resistance

No quarter was given during the suppression of the resistance in the Escambray mountains, where former rebels from the War Against Batista took different sides.[18] Ramiro Valdes Menendez was Minister of the Interior in 1961.[19]

Between April and October 1961, hundreds of executions took place in response to the invasion. They took place at various prisons, particularly at the dreaded Fortaleza de la Cabana and El Morro Castle, 18th-century Spanish fortresses built to protect Havana Harbor. Castro had converted their dungeons into prisons, their walls into paredones de fusilamiento (firing squad walls). Infiltration team leaders Antonio Diaz Pou and Raimundo E. Lopez, as well as underground students Virgilio Campaneria, Alberto Tapia, and more than one hundred others died within these colonial prisons.[20]

Invasion

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Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007)
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On the morning of April 15, 1961, three flights of B-26B Invader light bomber aircraft displaying Cuban Fuerza Armada Revolucionaria (FAR — Revolutionary Armed Force) markings bombed and strafed the Cuban airfields of San Antonio de Los Baños, Antonio Maceo International Airport, and the airfield at Ciudad Libertad.

Operation Puma, the code name given to the offensive counter air attacks against the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces, called for 48 hours of air strikes across the island to effectively eliminate the Cuban air force, ensuring Brigade 2506 complete air superiority over the island prior to the actual landing at the Bay of Pigs. This failed because the air strikes were not continued as was originally planned.

The second wave of air strikes, designed to wipe out the remainder of Castro's air force, was canceled. President Kennedy wanted the operation to look as if the Cuban exiles could have planned it, so that his administration could claim "plausible deniability" and avoid responsibility for the invasion as a U.S. operation. This was the same reason for which the landing site had been moved from Trinidad, which was close to the Escambray Mountains, an anticommunist rebel stronghold, where the anti Castro forces would have been able to reach sanctuary in case of failure. Moreover, Trinidad not only had great port facilities for landing the invasion force, armaments and supplies, but more importantly, was a counterrevolutionary fervent of activity, where a rising of the population could have been possible. President Kennedy, despite the CIA's objections, moved the landing site to the Bay of Pigs area. CIA Chief of Operations, Richard Bissell, had chosen this site for the above reasons, but the President, upholding plausible deniability, insisted it be moved. The cancellation of the air strikes, the change of the landing site, and ultimately, the lack of U.S. air cover and support during the invasion, sealed the fate of the mission and the lives of many of the men of the invasion force.[21]

Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, had been embarrassed by revelations that the first wave of air strikes had been carried out by U.S. planes despite his repeated denials that this was so. He contacted McGeorge Bundy who, unaware of the critical importance to the mission of the second wave, canceled the air strike despite Kennedy's earlier approval for it. Although Castro had prior knowledge of the invasion, the Cuban air force planes were virtually a sitting duck force on the ground and could have been wiped out, if the second and third waves of attack had been launched as originally planned.[22][23]

Map showing the location of the Bay of Pigs.
Map showing the location of the Bay of Pigs.

Of the Brigade 2506 aircraft that sortied on the morning of April 15, one was tasked with establishing the CIA cover story for the invasion. The slightly modified two-seat B-26B used for this mission was piloted by Captain Mario Zuniga. Prior to departure, the engine cowling from one of the aircraft's two engines was removed by maintenance personnel, fired upon, then re-installed to give the appearance that the aircraft had taken ground fire at some point during its flight.[citation needed]

Captain Zuniga departed from the exile base in Nicaragua on a solo, low-flying mission that took him over the westernmost province of Pinar del Río, Cuba, and then northeast toward Key West, Florida. Once across the island, Captain Zuniga climbed steeply away from the waves of the Florida Straits to an altitude where he would be detected by U.S. radar installations to the north of Cuba.

At altitude and a safe distance north of the island, Captain Zuniga feathered the engine with the pre-installed bullet holes in the engine cowling, radioed a mayday call and requested immediate permission to land at Boca Chica Naval Air Station a few kilometers northeast of Key West. This account differs from Cuban government reports that Sea Fury, B-26 fighter bombers and T-33 trainers flown by a few Cuban, notably Rafael del Pino, and some left-wing Chilean and Nicaraguan pilots[24][25], loyal to Castro attacked the older slower B-26s flown by the invading force.[26]

By the time of Captain Zuniga's announcement to the world mid-morning on April 15, all but one of the Brigade's Douglas bombers were back over the Caribbean on the three and a half hour return leg to their base in Nicaragua to re-arm and refuel. Upon landing, however, the flight crews were met with a cable from Washington ordering the indefinite stand-down of all further combat operations over Cuba.

On April 17, four 2,400-ton chartered transports (named the Houston, Río Escondido, Caribe, and Atlántico) transported 1,511 Cuban exiles to the Bay of Pigs on the southern coast of Cuba. They were accompanied by two CIA-owned infantry landing crafts (LCI's), called the Blagar and Barbara J, containing supplies, ordnance, and equipment. The small army hoped to find support from the local population, intending to cross the island to Havana. The CIA assumed the invasion would spark a popular uprising against Castro. However, the Escambray rebels had been contained by Cuban militia directed by Francisco Ciutat de Miguel. By the time the invasion began, Castro had already executed some who were suspected of colluding with the American campaign (notably two former "Comandantes" Humberto Sorí Marin and William Alexander Morgan[27][28] Others executed included Alberto Tapia Ruano, a Catholic youth leader. April was a bloody month for the resistance. Several hundred thousand were imprisoned before, during and after the invasion.[29]

After landing, it soon became evident that the exiles were not going to receive effective support at the site of the invasion and were likely to lose. Reports from both sides describe tank battles involving heavy USSR equipment.[30] Kennedy decided against giving the faltering invasion U.S. air support (though four U.S. pilots were killed in Cuba during the invasion) because of his opposition to overt intervention. Kennedy also canceled several sorties of bombings (only two took place) on the grounded Cuban air force, which might have crippled the Cuban air capabilities and given air superiority to the invaders. U.S. Marines were not sent in[31].

Air action

Aviation is commonly considered the deciding factor during the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Cuban government navy forces had been destroyed early with much loss of life while still in port at Rio de Las Casas base.

Initially the CIA planned a surprise air attack using B-26Bs on the Cuban Air Force, the Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria (FAR). This took place in the early morning of April 15 with eight B-26s attacking the Antonio Maceo airport and various air bases. The attack left Cuban forces with "two B-26s, two Sea Furies, and two T-33As at San Antonio de los Baños Airbase, and only one Sea Fury at the Antonio Maceo Airport" while two of the attacking bombers were damaged[32]. However, these surviving FAR aircraft, though few, were of good quality and, with a mix of fighter/bombers and ground attack aircraft, still a well-balanced force to use in defense against an amphibious invasion. By contrast, the CIA-provided aircraft mix lacked the flexibility necessary to achieve air superiority. However, the leadership of the air forces of the Cuban government was in disarray. The former driver for Raul Castro, "Maro" Guerra Bermejo, was replaced on the second day of action by Castro's Minister of Communication Raúl Curbelo Morales; at this time the Hispano-Soviet pilots had not yet arrived[33]

After this initial success, the CIA/Exile air force suffered considerable reverses. When the invasion started, the remaining FAR Hawker Sea Furies were able to engage the Exile forces on the beaches within 15 minutes. When the FAR B-26s arrived to take over bombing the beaches, the Hawkers changed targets to the amphibious support ships, damaging the flagship "Marsopa" and sinking the "Houston", which was the main supply ship, for the loss of one aircraft.

In response the invaders ordered four B-26s to resume bombing and strafing missions using napalm, but two were quickly shot down and the other two retreated, one badly damaged. However, at least one of these attacks is believed to have caused at least nine hundred casualties to the Castro forces.[34] Thereafter, the FAR enjoyed almost total air superiority. The next day, the FAR shot down two opposing B-26s, and the day after that, ten were shot down.

Land action

In the beginning, the militia on the beach surrendered, and the invaders moved to control the causeways. There the fighting became intense, and Cuban army casualities were high, both as a result of firepower from the invaders and the strafing B-26. A photo of a burned bus, presumably one of those used to transport militia, can be seen on page 154 of Wyden (1979) However, once their air support was eliminated and after expending all ammunition, the invaders were forced back to the beach[35]. The land action was very bloody. Carlos Franqui wrote:[36][35][37][38][39]

“We lost a lot of men. This frontal attack of men against machines (the enemy tanks) had nothing to do with guerrilla war; in fact it was a Russian tactic, probably the idea of the two Soviet generals, both of Spanish origin (they fought for the Republic in the Spanish Civil War and fled to the Soviet Union to later fight in World War II. One of them was a veteran, a fox named Ciutah (sic). He (Ciutah) was sent by the Red Army and the Party as an advisor and was the father of the new Cuban army. He was the only person who could have taken charge of the Girón campaign. The other Hispano-Russian general was an expert in antiguerrilla war who ran the Escambray cleanup. But the real factor in our favor at Girón was the militias: Almejeira’s column embarked on a suicide mission, they were massacred but they reached the beach.”

Sea action

Naval action during the Bay of Pigs extended beyond the attacks on the invaders' supply vessels. The Cuban government lost at least one vessel, the P.C. Baire, with extensive but apparently not specifically reported loss of life.[40] The invader command ship Blagar successfully fought off attacking aircraft.[41]

Aftermath

In the air battle, ten Cuban exiles, four U.S. pilots, and six Cuban Air Force pilots were killed in action.

By the time fighting ended on April 21, 68 exiles were dead and the rest were captured. Estimates of Cuban forces killed vary with the source, but are believed to have been far higher.

The 1,209 captured exiles were quickly put on trial. A few were executed and the rest sentenced to thirty years in prison for treason. After 20 months of negotiation with the United States, Cuba released the exiles in exchange for $53 million in food and medicine.

Cuba's losses during the Bay of Pigs Invasion are unknown, but most sources estimate them to be in the thousands. Triay[42] mentions 4,000 casualties; Lynch[43] states about 5,000. Other sources indicate over 2,200 casualties. Unofficial reports list that seven Cuban army infantry battalions suffered significant losses during the fighting.

In one air attack alone, Cuban forces suffered an estimated 1,800 casualties when a mixture of army troops, militia, and civilians were caught on an open causeway riding in civilian buses towards the battle scene in which several buses were hit by napalm.[44][45][46]

The Cuban government initially reported its army losses to be 87 dead and many more wounded during the three days of fighting the invaders. The number of those killed in action in Cuba's army during the battle eventually ran to 140, and then finally to 161. However, these figures are for Cuban army losses only, not including milita or armed civilian loyalists. Thus in the most accepted calculations, a total of around 2,000 (perhaps as many as 5,000, see above) Cuban militia fighting for the Republic of Cuba may have been killed, wounded or missing in action.

The total casualties for the brigade were 104 members killed, and a few hundred more were wounded.

After the Bay of Pigs, Castro fearing the US might try to invade Cuba again, obtained nuclear warheads from the USSR - thus starting the Cuban Missile Crisis.

In 1979 the body of Alabama National Guard Captain Thomas Willard Ray, who was shot down flying a B-26, was returned to his family from Cuba. In the 1990s, the CIA admitted to his links to the agency and awarded him its highest award, the Intelligence Star.[47]

Prisoners

In May 1961 Castro proposed an exchange of the surviving members of the assault for 500 bulldozers. The trade rose to US$28 million.[4] Negotiations were non-productive until after the Cuban missile crisis. On December 21, 1962, Castro and James B. Donovan, a U.S. lawyer signed an agreement to exchange the 1,113 prisoners for US$53 million in food and medicine; the money was raised by private donations.[48] On December 29, 1962, Kennedy met with the returning brigade at Palm Beach, Florida.[4]

Reaction

Image:JFK.jpg
Robert F. Kennedy's Statement on Cuba and Neutrality Laws, April 20, 1961

The failed invasion severely embarrassed the Kennedy Administration and made Castro wary of future U.S. intervention in Cuba. As a result of the failure, CIA director Allen Dulles, deputy CIA director Charles Cabell, and Deputy Director of Operations Richard Bissell were all forced to resign. All three were held responsible for the planning of the operation at the CIA. Responsibility of the Kennedy administration and the U.S. State Department for modifications of the plans was not apparent until later.

In August 1961, during an economic conference of the Organization of American States in Punta del Este, Uruguay, Che Guevara sent a note to Kennedy through Richard N. Goodwin, a young secretary of the White House. It said: "Thanks for Playa Girón. Before the invasion, the revolution was weak. Now it's stronger than ever."[49] Grayston Lynch among others, also points to Castro's rounding up of hundreds of thousands of anti-Castro and potentially anti-Castro Cubans across the island prior to and during the invasion (e.g. Priestland, 2003), destroying any chances for a general uprising against the Castro regime. Thus the million voices that had cried "Cuba si, comunismo NO!" on November 28 1959,[50] were gone or silent.

Many military leaders almost certainly expected the invasion to fail but thought that Kennedy would send in Marines to save the exiles. Kennedy, however, did not want a full scale war and abandoned the exiles.

Kennedy not informed

An April 29 2000 Washington Post article, "Soviets Knew Date of Cuba Attack", reported that the CIA had information indicating that the Soviet Union knew the invasion was going to take place and did not inform Kennedy. Radio Moscow broadcast an English-language newscast on April 13, 1961 predicting the invasion "in a plot hatched by the CIA" using paid "criminals" within a week. The invasion took place four days later.

According to British minister David Ormsby-Gore, British intelligence estimates, which had been made available to the CIA, indicated that the Cuban people were predominantly behind Castro and that there was no likelihood of mass defections or insurrections following the invasion.[4] Apparently British Intelligence chose to ignore news reports of major fighting in the Escambray mountains, with artillery bombardment and civilian evacuations (e.g. AP report in Bennington Evening Banner, Jan 16, 1961, p. 3) which later turned out to be correct.

More recent analysis suggests that, probably because of the Castro government's almost complete blackout of actions outside Havana, the sources such as those used in the Ormsby-Gore intelligence estimate were not aware of the following related material: On April 14, 1961, the guerrillas of Agapito Rivera fought Cuban government forces near Las Cruces, Montembo, Las Villas, where several government forces were killed and others wounded.[51] On April 16, Merardo Leon, Jose Leon, and 14 others staged armed rising at Las Delicias Estate in Las Villas, only four survived[52] Leonel Martinez and 12 others took to the country side (ibid). On April 17, 1961, Osvaldo Ramírez (then chief of the rural resistance to Castro) was captured in Aromas de Velázquez and immediately executed.[53] The ruthlessness with which this resistance was suppressed is well described in Franqui.[54]

On April 3, 1961, a bomb attack on militia barracks in Bayamo killed four militia and wounded eight more; on April 6, the Hershey Sugar factory in Matanzas was destroyed by sabotage; on April 18, Directorio guerrilla Marcelino Magaňaz died in action in Sierra Maestra.[55] On April 19, at least seven Cubans plus two US citizens (Angus K. McNair and Howard F. Anderson) were executed in Pinar del Rio province.[56]. However, the general Cuban population was not well informed, except for CIA funded Radio Swan.[57] As of May of 1960, almost all means of public communication were in the government’s hands.[58][59]

Effect of Invasion in Cuba

The invasion is often criticized as making Castro even more popular, adding nationalistic sentiments to the support for his economic policies. Following the initial B-26 bombings, he declared the revolution "Marxist-Leninist". After the invasion, he pursued closer relations with the Soviet Union, partly for protection, which helped pave the way for the Cuban Missile Crisis a year and a half later. Castro was now increasingly wary of further US intervention and more susceptible to Soviet suggestions of placing nuclear weapons on Cuba to ensure its security.

Invasion force

Many who fought for the CIA in the Bay of Pigs remained loyal after the fiasco. Some Bay of Pigs veterans became officers in the US Army in Vietnam, including 6 colonels, 19 lieutenant colonels, 9 majors, and 29 captains[60]. By March 2007, about half of the Brigade had died.[61]

There are still yearly nationwide drills in Cuba during the 'Dia de la Defensa' (Defense Day) to prepare the population for an invasion.

Playa Giron today

Image:Airplane in Museo Giron.jpg
Museum of the invasion
Wikimedia Commons has media related to:

Little remains of the original village, which in the 1960s was small and remote. It is still remote, with just a single road to the village and out again, but it has grown markedly since the invasion. Few people there today were residents at the time. The road from the north is marked by frequent memorials to the Cuban dead. There are billboards marking where invaders were rounded up and showing pictures of their being led away. Another at the entrance to the village quotes Castro's comment that the Bay of Pigs was the "first defeat of Yanqui imperialism." A two-room museum, with aircraft and other military equipment outside, shows pictures, arms and maps of the attack and photos of the Cuban soldiers who died.

Billboards and other material refer to "mercenaries".

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Triay p. 81
  2. ^ Triay p. 110
  3. ^ Lynch p. 148
  4. ^ a b c d e A Thousand days:John F Kennedy in the White House Arthur Schlesinger Jr 1965
  5. ^ Air Force, Bay Pigs. Latin American Studies.
  6. ^ Welch and Blight, p. 113.
  7. ^ Cuba in Revolution—Escape from a Lost Paradise (2002) pp. 93–4.
  8. ^ Paz-Sanchez, 2001, pp. 189–99.
  9. ^ Militares (es).
  10. ^ British Foreign Office. Chancery American Department, Foreign Office, London September 2, 1959 (2181/59) to British Embassy Havana classified as restricted Released 2000 by among British Foreign Office papers. Foreign Offices Files for Cuba Part 1: Revolution in Cuba “in our letter 1011/59 May 6 we mentioned that a Russian workers' delegation had been invited to participate in the May Day celebrations here, but had been delayed. The interpreter with the party, which arrived later and stayed in Cuba a few days, was called Vadim Kotchergin although he was at the time using what he subsequently claimed was his mother's name of Liston (?). He remained in the background, and did not attract any attention.” These two agents went on to train overseas personnel including Carlos the Jackal (Ilich Ramírez Sánchez) and subcomandante Marcos (Rafael Sebastián Guillén).
  11. ^ El campo de entrenamiento "Punto Cero" donde el Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC) adiestra a terroristas nacionales e internacionales (es). Cuban American Foundation (2005-11-07). Retrieved on 2007-10-22. “Los coroneles soviéticos de la KGB Vadim Kochergin y Victor Simonov (ascendido a general en 1970) fueron entrenadores en "Punto Cero" desde finales de los años 60 del siglo pasado. Uno de los" graduados" por Simonov en este campo de entrenamiento es Ilich Ramírez Sánchez, más conocido como "Carlos El Chacal". Otro "alumno" de esta instalación del terror es el mexicano Rafael Sebastián Guillén, alias "subcomandante Marcos", quien se "graduó" en "Punto Cero" a principio de los años 80.”
  12. ^ Alfonso, Pablo 2001 Los Ultimos Castristas. Centro de Documentacion y Formacion, Caracas. ISBN 978-9800756577, pp. 18–9.
  13. ^ Cuban Gen. del Valle dies (circa 11-16-07, no birth date given). News. Yahoo!. Retrieved on 2007-11-16. “After Batista fled and the rebels took control of the island on Jan. 1, 1959, del Valle held various positions in Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces. He was army chief of staff when a U.S.-backed exile army tried unsuccessfully to invade the Bay of Pigs in 1961, as well as the following year when the U.S. discovery of Soviet missiles on the island pushed the world to the brink of nuclear war. The Soviets eventually removed the missiles. Del Valle was also interior minister in the late 1960s and health minister from 1979 to 1986”
  14. ^ LUSSON Batlle, Antonio Enrique. Cuadro Institucional del Pais (PDF). Cuba Transition Project. University of Miami. Retrieved on 2007-11-18. “He was second in command to Almeida in 1959 at Managua Garrison and for several months was the Chief of Logistics. He also distinguished himself at the Bay of Pigs.”
  15. ^ Dreke, Victor 2002 From the Escambray to the Congo. Pathfinder Press, New York. ISBN 0873489470 pp. 10.28, 90, 99–102.
  16. ^ Brothers in Arms Press Release. Idol.
  17. ^ News. Screen Africa.
  18. ^ Dreke, Victor 2002 From the Escambray to the Congo. Pathfinder Press, New York. ISBN 0873489470 pp. 40–117
  19. ^ Alfonso, Pablo 2001 Los Ultimos Castristas. Centro de Documentacion y Formacion, Caracas. ISBN 978-9800756577, pp. 125–6.
  20. ^ Faria pp. 94–5.
  21. ^ Faria, Miguel A (2002). Cuba in Revolution: Escape from a Lost Paradise, 93–8. 
  22. ^ LAZO, Mario, Dagger in the Heart: American Policy Failures in Cuba (1970), Twin Circle Publishing, New York, pp. 257–312.
  23. ^ WYDEN, Peter, Bay of Pigs: The untold story (1979), Simon and Schuster, New York, pp. 93–172.
  24. ^ Lagas, 1964
  25. ^ Somoza-Debayle and Jack Cox, 1980
  26. ^ Overall, Mario E; SHEPHERD Jake, HAGEDORN Dan (Feb 1998). The Rage of the Furies. The Latin American Aviation Historical Society.
  27. ^ "Morgan Buried In Cuban Crypt, Fugitive Wife Stays In Hiding", La Habana: Associated Press, 1961-03-13. Retrieved on 2007-12-24. 
  28. ^ Bay of Pigs, 40 Years After: Chronology. The National Security Archive. The George Washington University.
  29. ^ Priestland, 2003
  30. ^ Enrique Lister. Spartacus Educational. School Net.
  31. ^ Fontova, Humberto (2002-04-29). The Bay of Pigs: The Truth. News Max. Retrieved on 2007-12-24.
  32. ^ Klaus, Erich (2003-11-05). Cuba Air Force History. World Air Forces. Aeroflight. Retrieved on 2007-12-24.
  33. ^ del Pino, Rafael (2002-03-02). Como te Paga un Dictador (es). Network 54. Retrieved on 2007-12-24.
  34. ^ Clark, Leslie. "CIA to honor Bay of Pigs vets at its art gallery", Miami, FL: Miami Herald, 2007-10-18. "…an oil painting will be unveiled that depicts one of the successes of the covert operation: an April 1961 aerial attack on Castro's forces that took out an estimated 900 soldiers. …Titled Lobo Flight, the 40- by 30-inch painting shows a vintage B-26 twin engine bomber flown by Connie Seigrist — the lead pilot of a convoy of B-26s painted to look like Cuban aircraft — dropping bombs onto a column of Cuban troops heading to the beach, where a group of CIA-trained Cuban exiles had landed to attempt to overthrow Castro…" 
  35. ^ a b Lynch, Grayston L. 2000.
  36. ^ De Paz-Sánchez, 2001.
  37. ^ Johnson, 1964.
  38. ^ Franqui, 1984.
  39. ^ Vivés, 1984.
  40. ^ Fuentes, Norberto 1982 Posicion Uno. Ediciones Union. Havana pp. 30–2.
  41. ^ Lynch, paper edition 2000 p. 96.
  42. ^ Triay p. 110.
  43. ^ Lynch p. 148.
  44. ^ Morrissey, Michael D (Sep 2001). The Bay of Pigs Revisited.
  45. ^ English, Joe R (1984-03-16). The Bay of Pigs: A Struggle For Freedom. Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
  46. ^ De la Cova, Antonio Rafael (1999). "Bay of Pigs Invasion: April 17–19, 1961". Encyclopedia of North American History. Ed. SUPER, John C. New York, NY: Marshall Cavendish. Retrieved on 2007-12-24. 
  47. ^ Thomas, Eric. Local Man Forever Tied To Cuban Leader: Father Frozen, Displayed by Fidel Castro. KGO ABC7, KGO-TV/DT. Retrieved on 2007-02-22.
  48. ^ The Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba 1961. On War.
  49. ^ {{cite book | last = Anderson | first = Jon Lee | authorlink = Jon Lee Anderson | coauthors = | editor = | others = | title = Che Guevara. Una vida revolucionaria | origdate = | origyear = 1997 | origmonth = | url = | format = | accessdate = | accessyear = | accessmonth = | edition = | series = | date = | year = 2006 | month = | publisher = Anagrama | location = Barcelona | language = spanish | isbn = 84-339-2572-5 | oclc = | doi = | id = | pages = 482 | chapter = 24. Esos tiempos atómicos | chapterurl = | quote = Cuatro meses

    Later analysis

    CIA report

    The CIA wrote a detailed internal report that laid blame for the failure squarely on internal incompetence. Errors by the CIA and other American analysts contributed to the debacle:

    • The administration believed that the troops could retreat to the mountains to lead a guerrilla war if they lost in open battle. The mountains were too far to reach on foot, and the troops were deployed in swamp land, where they were easily surrounded.
    • They believed that the involvement of the US in the incident could be denied.
    • They believed that Cubans would be grateful to be liberated from Fidel Castro and would quickly join the battle. This support failed to materialize; many hundreds of thousands of others were arrested, and some executed, prior to the landings. (see also Priestland 2003; Lynch, 2000).

    The CIA's near certainty that the Cuban people would rise up and join them was based on the agency's extremely weak presence on the ground in Cuba. Castro's counterintelligence, trained by Soviet Bloc specialists including Enrique Lister,<ref></ref> had infiltrated most resistance groups. Because of this, almost all the information that came from exiles and defectors was "contaminated." CIA operative E. Howard Hunt had interviewed Cubans in Havana prior to the invasion; in a future interview with CNN, he said, "…all I could find was a lot of enthusiasm for Fidel Castro."<ref>{{cite web

    | url = http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/18/interviews/hunt
| title = Backyeard
| accessdate = 2007-12-24
| last = Hunt
| first = Howard
| year = 1998
| work = Cold War
| publisher = CNN
}}</li>

    <li id="_note-38">'''[[#_ref-38|^]]''' {{cite web | publisher = Agua de Pasajeros | title = Congreso Catolico Cuba 1959 | language = es | url = http://aguadadepasajeros.bravepages.com/cubahistoria/congreso_catolico_cuba_1959.htm}}</li> <li id="_note-39">'''[[#_ref-39|^]]''' Corzo, 2003 p. 83</li> <li id="_note-40">'''[[#_ref-40|^]]''' Corzo, 2003 p. 85</li> <li id="_note-41">'''[[#_ref-41|^]]''' {{cite web | title = Nuevo Acción | language = es | url = http://www.nuevoaccion.com/}}</li> <li id="_note-42">'''[[#_ref-42|^]]''' Franqui 1984, pp. 111–5 </li> <li id="_note-43">'''[[#_ref-43|^]]''' Corzo, 2003 p. 79–89</li> <li id="_note-44">'''[[#_ref-44|^]]''' Corzo, 2003 p. 90</li> <li id="_note-45">'''[[#_ref-45|^]]''' {{cite web | url = http://www.firmaspress.com/viaje-al-corazon-de-cuba.pdf | format = PDF | title = Viaje al Corazón de Cuba | language = es | publisher = Plaza & Janés | year = 1999 | last = Montaner | first Carlos Alberto}}</li> <li id="_note-46">'''[[#_ref-46|^]]''' {{cite news | title = The New York Times | date = 1960-05-26 | page = 5}}</li> <li id="_note-47">'''[[#_ref-47|^]]''' {{cite web | url = http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Cuba83eng/chap.5.htm | title = The Situation of Human Rights in Cuba, Seventh Report — Chapter V | publisher = Organization of American States | date = 1983-10-04 | accessdate = 2004-12-24 | author = Inter-American Commission on Human Rights}}</li> <li id="_note-48">'''[[#_ref-48|^]]''' Enrique Ros pp. 287–98.</li> <li id="_note-49">'''[[#_ref-49|^]]''' {{cite news | last = Iuspa-Abbott | first = Paola | accessdate = 2007-03-27 | title = Palm Beach County Bay of Pigs veterans remember invasion of Cuba | publisher = South Florida Sun-Sentinel | url = http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/cubanews/2007w13/msg00006.htm}}</li></ol></ref>


References

  • Anderson, Jon L. 1998 Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life. Grove/Atlantic ISBN 0-8021-3558-7
  • Corzo, Pedro 2003 Cuba Cronología de la lucha contra el totalitarismo. Ediciones Memorias, Miami. ISBN 1890829242
  • Faria, Miguel, A, Cuba in Revolution—Escape from a Lost Paradise (2002) Hacienda Publishing, pp. 93–102, notes# 16 and 24. ISBN 0-9641077-3-2.
  • Franqui, Carlos 1984 (foreword by G. Cabrera Infante and translated by Alfred MacAdam from Spanish 1981 version) Family portrait with Fidel. 1985 edition Random House First Vintage Books, New York. ISBN 0394726200 pp. 111–128
  • Lynch, Grayston L. 2000 Decision for Disaster: Betrayal at the Bay of Pigs. Potomac Books Dulles Virginia ISBN 1-57488-237-6
  • Hunt, E. Howard 1973 Give us this day. Arlington House, New Rochelle, N.Y. ISBN 978-0870002281
  • Johnson, Haynes 1964 The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506. W. W. Norton & Co Inc. New York. 1974 edition ISBN 0-393-04263-4
  • Lagas, Jacques 1964 Memorias de un capitán rebelde. Editorial del Pácifico. Santiago, Chile.
  • Lazo, Mario 1968, 1970 Dagger in the heart: American policy failures in Cuba. Twin Circle. New York. I968 edition Library of Congress number 6831632, 1970 edition, ASIN B0007DPNJS
  • de Paz-Sánchez, Manuel 2001 Zona de Guerra, España y la revolución Cubana (1960–1962), Taller de Historia, Tenerife Gran Canaria ISBN 8479263644
  • Priestland, Jane (editor) 2003 British Archives on Cuba: Cuba under Castro 1959–1962. Archival Publications International Limited, 2003, London ISBN 1-903008-20-4
  • Jean Edward Smith, "Bay of Pigs: The Unanswered Questions," The Nation, (Apr. 13, 1964), p. 360–363.
  • Somoza-Debayle, Anastasio and Jack Cox 1980 Nicaragua Betrayed Western Islands Publishers, pp. 169–180 ISBN 088279235
  • Ros, Enrique 1994 (1998) Giron la verdadera historia. Ediciones Universales (Colección Cuba y sus jueces) third edition Miami ISBN 0-89729-738-5
  • Thomas, Hugh 1998 Cuba or The Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press, New York Updated Ed. ISBN 0-306-80827-7
  • Triay, Victor 2001 Andres Bay of Pigs. University Press of Florida, Gainesville ISBN 0-8130-2090-5
  • Welch, David A and James G Blight (editors) 1998 Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Frank Cass Publishers, London and Portland Oregon ISBN 0-7146-4883-3 ISBN 0-7146-4435-8
  • Vivés, Juan (Pseudonym, of a former veteran and Castro Intelligence Official; Translated to Spanish from 1981 Les Maîtres de Cuba. Opera Mundi, Paris by Zoraida Valcarcel) 1982 Los Amos de Cuba. EMCÉ Editores, Buenos Aires. ISBN 9500400758
  • Wyden, Peter 1979 Bay of Pigs Simon. and Schuster New York ISBN 0-671-24006-40

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