Operation Banner

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Categories: British Army deployments | Military operations involving the United Kingdom | The Troubles in Northern Ireland

Operation Banner was the operational name for the British Armed Forces' campaign in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 2007, initially at the request of the then Unionist government of Northern Ireland in support to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (1972-2001), and later to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) (2001-2007). Its role was to engage in counter-terrorism and public order operations in response to the Troubles, to assist the British Government in its objective of restoring normality in Northern Ireland^[1]; the support was primarily from the British Army, with the Royal Air Force providing helicopter support as required. The operation ended at midnight on 31 July 2007, making it the longest continuous deployment in the British Army's history, lasting some thirty-eight years.^[2]

1 Role of the armed forces
2 Withdrawal
3 Local reception
4 Lessons learned from Operation Banner
5 References
6 External links

Role of the armed forces

Image:Eod technician ireland.jpg

A British Army Ammunition Technical Officer approaches a suspect device in Northern Ireland

The role of the armed forces in their support role to the police was defined by the British Army in the following terms:^[3]

Routine support - Includes such tasks as providing protection to the police in carrying out normal policing duties in areas of terrorist threat; patrolling around military and police bases to deter terrorist attack and supporting police-directed counter terrorist operations.

Additional support - Assistance where the police have insufficient assets of their own; this includes the provision of observation posts along the border and increased support during times of civil disorder. The military can provide soldiers to protect and, if necessary, supplement police lines and cordons. The military can provide heavy plant to remove barricades and construct barriers, and additional armoured vehicles and helicopters to help in the movement of police and soldiers.

Specialist support - includes bomb disposal, search and tracker dogs, and divers from the Royal Engineers.

The operation saw 763 Service deaths and 6,100 injuries.^[4]

Withdrawal

In August 2005, it was announced that due to the security situation improving and in accordance with the Good Friday Agreement provisions, Operation Banner would end by 1 August 2007. ^[5] This involved troop numbers being reduced to 5,000 and the Northern Ireland based battalions of the Royal Irish Regiment - which grew out of the Ulster Defence Regiment - were stood down on 1 September 2006.^[6]

Adam Ingram, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, has stated that assuming the maintenance of an enabling environment, British Army support to the PSNI after 31 July 2007 was to reduce to a residual level, e.g. in providing specialised ordnance disposal and support for public order as described in Patten recommendations 59 and 66, should this be needed,^[7] thus ending the British Army's emergency operation in Northern Ireland.

Local reception

The army presence in Northern Ireland was initially welcomed by the Catholic population, who saw them as a neutral force to protect them against the RUC and loyalists, but this changed following a three-day military clamp down on the Falls area of West Belfast in July 1970.^[8]^[9] The Irish journalist Fintan O'Toole argues that "both militarily and ideologically, the army was a player, not a referee".^[10].

Lessons learned from Operation Banner

In July 2007, under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 the Ministry of Defence published Operation Banner: An analysis of military operations in Northern Ireland, which reflected on the Army's role in the conflict and the strategic and operational lessons drawn from their involvement. ^[2]^[11] One of the major conclusions of the report states:

“

Martin van Creveld has said that the British Army is unique in Northern Ireland in its success against an irregular force. It should be recognised that the Army did not 'win' in any recognisable way; rather it achieved its desired end-state, which allowed a political process to be established without unacceptable levels of intimidation. Security force operations suppressed the level of violence to a level which the population could live with, and with which the RUC and later the PSNI could cope. The violence was reduced to an extent which made it clear to the PIRA that they would not win through violence. This is a major achievement, and one with which the security forces from all three Services, with the Army in the lead, should be entirely satisfied. It took a long time but, as van Crefeld said, that success is unique.

”

The US military have sought to incorporate lessons from Operation Banner in their field manual.^[12]